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Bread, Cheese and Genocide: Imagining the Destruction of Peoples in Medieval Western 
Europe 
 
LEN SCALES 
University of Durham 
 
Abstract 
Western European society in the Middle Ages is generally perceived as lying, in its modes of 
thought and action, far remote from those acts of mass ethnic destruction which have been a 
recurrent element in world history since the early twentieth century. Yet medieval Europeans 
too were capable of envisaging the violent obliteration of peoples. Indeed, the view that such 
acts had occurred in times past and were liable to occur again was deeply embedded in 
medieval thought and assumption. For some commentators, the destruction of certain peoples 
was inseparable from the making of others, an essential motor of historical change, 
underpinned by biblical narratives of divine election and condemnation. Such notions 
constituted a matrix within which medieval writers interpreted real acts of social and political 
violence, the scale and the ethnic foundations of which they were thus naturally inclined to 
inflate. Nevertheless, their belief in the recurrent historical reality of ethnic destruction was, in 
their own terms, well founded – although medieval conceptions of what constituted the 
undoing of peoples were broader than most modern definitions of ‘genocide’. By the later 
Middle Ages, moreover, government was increasingly perceived – not without justification – 
as a powerful agent for re-making the ethnic map. 
 
‘And many Flemings lost their heads at that time, and namely those who could not say Bread 
and Cheese, but Case and Brode.’1 The words are those of a London chronicler from the 
fifteenth century, looking back on ‘the rising of the commons of England against the lords’, in 
June 1381. And that, apart from a couple of cursory jottings, was that: it was the slaughter of 
the ‘Flemings’ that, for this particular writer, seemed with hindsight especially to stand out 
among those tumultuous happenings.
2
 He was in good company. Geoffrey Chaucer, in the 
hunting scene in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, declares that ‘Jakke Straw and his meynee, Ne made 
nevere shoutes half so shrille, Whan that they wolden any Flemyng kille’. It is the only 
specific reference to the rising that Chaucer makes.
3
 The inter-ethnic violence is recounted 
more fully in the Latin chronicles which preserve most of the detailed information about 
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events in London.
4
 ‘For you could see heaps of dead bodies and corpses lying in the squares 
and other places’, wrote the Monk of Westminster. ‘And so they spent the day, thinking only 
of the massacre of the Flemings.’5 
 Modern historians of 1381 have thought (or at any rate written) about it somewhat less 
avidly. In an authoritative collection of essays on the rising, published in 1984, the attack on 
the Flemings earns precisely one sentence.
6
 Liberal academic distaste doubtless plays a part, 
in that the socially-progressive elements in fourteenth-century English life are scarcely 
expected to be caught indulging in acts of ethnic cleansing. When they do, their actions 
appear, in the words of Steven Justice, ‘the most disreputable of the rebellion’.7 The slaughter 
of the Flemings has also perhaps seemed to modern eyes beyond the pale in a more 
fundamental way: it does not fit easily into accustomed frameworks for understanding pre-
modern social disorder. Butchering home-grown lawyers and bureaucrats appears natural and 
explicable enough; killing foreign merchants and artisans another matter entirely. That, at 
least, is what must be concluded from the rather baffled tone in which those historians who 
have considered the incident tend to refer to it.
8
 Medieval reporters are not, it is true, much 
more forthcoming as to why the massacre happened. The explanation in their case, however, 
probably lies less with modern-style incomprehension than its opposite: an assumption that 
the slaughter of aliens did not need much explaining, but was self-evidently what was likely 
to occur when ‘the commons of England’ – or their counterparts in other realms – were 
allowed to have their will.
9
 In the febrile political climate of the late medieval town, attacks 
on groups of privileged and unpopular foreigners were a more frequent occurrence than the 
fragmentary and scattered scholarly literature on the subject might lead readers initially to 
suppose.
10
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Tales of inter-ethnic bloodshed were woven into the basic stuff of medieval thought and 
assumption to a degree which modern scholarship has been apt to overlook. For just that 
reason they need to be handled with caution, since they were the kind of tales which grew in 
the telling, fitting themselves to established patterns, projecting clear-cut ethnic purges onto 
outbreaks of violence which must often have been both more limited in scope and more 
complex in character.
11
 In the case of the ‘Flemings’, the language test which supposedly 
sealed their fate – the most distinctively ethnic element in accounts of their destruction – is 
mentioned by just a single, late chronicler.
12
 The motif of unpopular outsiders being 
unmasked and killed after stumbling over tricky native words is encountered repeatedly in 
historical writings from various corners of medieval Europe.
13
 Often, the words themselves – 
‘bread and cheese’ or, in Bruges in 1302, ‘shield and friend’ – seem deliberately to evoke 
precisely the sorts of taken-for-granted solidarities or everyday domestic artefacts which 
distinguish the natural and known from the artificial and foreign.
14
 They are ‘us’ words. When 
a revolt among the Germans of Kraków was suppressed in 1312, it is reported that all lost 
their lives who could not pronounce the Polish names for several comparably homely objects: 
lentil, wheel, mill. Again, the source is of a later date.
15
 The biblical precedent, in the Book of 
Judges, of the Gileadites forcing the Ephraimites to say ‘shibboleth’, comes to mind, and was 
probably in the minds of medieval historiographers too.
16
 It is likely, then, that at least some 
such accounts were inspired less by the reputed course of events than by the authoritative, 
ancient prototypes which were available for recounting acts of inter-ethnic slaughter such as 
was assumed must have taken place. 
 Medieval writers seem to have found such happenings all too readily imaginable, even 
when the known facts may have been few and far between. The killing, on St Brice’s day 
1002, of ‘all the Danish men in England’ (as the Anglo Saxon Chronicle put it) is a case in 
point. The earliest records of the event – a brief note in the Chronicle, and incidental remarks 
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in an interpolated charter of Æthelred II – are scanty in the extreme.17 They offer few reliable 
clues to the gravity or extent of what Æthelred’s charter termed ‘a most just extermination’. 
Historians have been inclined, surely with good reason, to play it down.
18
 Later chroniclers, 
however, showed less restraint. William of Jumièges, writing more than half a century after 
the event, conjured up a nightmare vision of innocent children dashed against doorposts, 
while their mothers’ breasts were torn off by fierce dogs.19 If aspects of William’s imagery 
seem to recall those vigorous portrayals of the Massacre of the Innocents which were such a 
staple of medieval religious art, then that should at least call to mind just how accessible and 
familiar images of systematic and ‘total’ mass killing would have been to a learned – and 
potentially even a non-learned – medieval public.20 The terrible will of the ruler, of which 
Herod’s bloodbath stood as an archetypal reminder, was readily lent an ethnic colouring in 
medieval myth-making. The Merovingian Dagobert thus became, in a vernacular history from 
late medieval Strasbourg, ‘a fearsome and mighty king’ who had ‘conquered the Saxons and 
killed all boys who were longer than his sword’.21 
 The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, drawn up in 1948, makes reference to ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’.22 On this definition, it seems 
at best uncertain whether the bloody deeds so far encountered (except, no doubt, Dagobert’s) 
would qualify as genocidal. Even when inflated by the imaginations of subsequent reporters, 
they remained on the whole distinctly limited acts of killing, firmly rooted in the specificities 
of time, place and particular circumstances.
23
 Theorists of modern genocide have readily 
conceded that instances of extreme ethnic destruction are to be met with from time to time in 
pre-modern societies too (the fate of the native American peoples is often mentioned), while 
still, on the whole, insisting that genocide in its fullest sense is a phenomenon no older than 
the twentieth century.
24
 It is bound up, suggests Omer Bartov, with ‘the emergence of the 
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nation-state in Europe and the spread of European empires across the world’.25 The 
bureaucratic state, colonialism, popular mass mobilisation, and new, more discriminatory 
ideas about race and nationality: these, it has been argued, are some of the key elements 
underlying modern genocidal mentalities.
26
 
 The capacity of medieval government violently to re-fashion peoplehood may have 
been greater than such perspectives allow. Before considering this question, however, 
attention must first be given to the conceptual and ideological roots of genocide. Are these 
really as quintessentially modern as is often claimed? The propensity of medieval writers to 
expand fleeting or obscure acts of local violence to fill a larger, more avowedly ‘ethnic’ frame 
has already been encountered. Yet, when more general utterances on the subject are 
examined, the tone becomes still more unnervingly familiar. A Welsh chronicler claimed 
under the year 1114 that Henry I and his henchmen planned ‘to exterminate [the Welsh] 
completely or to drive them into the sea, so that the Britannic name should never more be 
mentioned’.27 In England, in the thirteenth century, supporters of Simon de Montfort 
suggested that the foreigners around the king intended ‘to blot out the name of the English’.28 
Things appear hardly less perilous at Latin Europe’s opposite extremity. According to a 
Polish chronicle from the fourteenth century, Germans close to the princes of Glogów had 
urged them to exterminate the entire Polish people, especially its spiritual and secular elites.
29
 
In 1307 the bishop of Kraków, to his enemies another German partisan, was accused by one 
of his clergy of having stated that, were he to fail in his aim of eliminating the Polish people, 
he would rather die than live.
30
 In annals from the same city, meanwhile, it was claimed that 
the Teutonic Knights had in mind to ‘exterminate the Polish language’.31 This was around the 
time that Edward I of England was informing his subjects that his French enemies proposed to 
wipe out the English language.
32
 The charge was to be repeated nearly two hundred years 
later by Edward IV, who accused his Lancastrian enemies of joining with the French, the 
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Scots, and other foreign foes ‘to destroye uttarly the people, the name, the tonge and all the 
bloud englyshe of this owr sayd Realme’.33 
 
Exterminare, eliminare: the terminology seems starkly unambiguous. Remarks such as these 
are not especially rare or anomalous in medieval writings and it would be easy to add to them. 
Taken at face value, they seem to attest patterns of thought which not only understood 
political organisation in fundamentally ethnic terms, but which viewed political strife as a 
process of inter-ethnic competition, in which only the fittest survived, with the annihilation of 
entire peoples the price of defeat. Matters are not, however, quite so clear-cut. As Rees Davies 
showed, in his magisterial studies of the peoples of medieval Britain, the language of ethnic 
destruction could in fact bear meanings more complex than may appear at first sight.
34
 A 
people might be undone in other ways than by slaughter or expulsion. Henry of Huntingdon’s 
famous verdict on the Norman Conquest was that God had dealt the English their just deserts, 
commanding that they should no longer exist as a people.
35
 Loss, not of life or homeland, but 
of power and independence therefore lay at the heart of this act of divinely-sanctioned 
extermination. A comparable way of thinking underlies the claim, enunciated in a short 
political tract from the mid-fourteenth century, that a Plantagenet succession to the Scottish 
throne must result in the ‘destruction, eradication and total extermination’ of the Scottish 
people.
36
 Nations or peoples were conceived in the Middle Ages as quintessentially political 
communities; changes in the political landscape thus threatened automatically to affect the 
standing, indeed the very existence, of imagined ethnic groups.
37
 
 Even adjustments to the administrative geography of the Catholic Church might, when 
combined with more extensive social and political movements, invoke for some the shadow 
of ethnic obliteration. Jakub Świnka, metropolitan of the Polish see of Gniezno, drew up in 
January 1285 a vehement protest addressed to several Roman cardinals, denouncing recent 
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alterations to the provincial boundaries of the Franciscan order in the east, which had seen 
most of Silesia incorporated into the order’s Saxon province.38 Viewed in light of the 
contemporary influx of German-speaking settlers into western Poland (the broader 
consequences of which Świnka likewise condemned), terminological shifts might, as he 
insisted, foreshadow and sanction larger, more sinister transformations. Unless such novelties 
were annulled, therefore, and ‘the land of Poland, … be regarded, as before, as Poland and not 
Saxony’, ‘we will be forced to lament with trembling voices the extermination of our people 
as well as the evident peril of our churches’.39 Names, language, laws and customs; these 
were elements which, for medieval observers, constituted the unity of the political and the 
ethnic community: the obliteration of any one of them as a result of political or even 
adminstrative change might thus constitute in itself a form of genocide. 
 Some characteristic patterns of assumption and argument are revealed in a manifesto 
issued in 1324 in the name of the Ludwig IV, the German ruler of the western Roman 
Empire.
40
 Pope John XXII had declared Ludwig excommunicate and his election null and 
void, and had laid claim to administer the Empire’s lands during its vacancy. The pope, 
fulminated Ludwig, was a malicious subvertor of canons and a violator of rights and customs, 
who intended totally to exterminate the holy Empire, its liberty and dignity, and also to 
exterminate and nullify the prince-electors of the Empire, all the Empire’s subjects, and all of 
Germany.
41
 The language, once again, is that of absolute destruction. But the writer’s 
concerns are all with rights, status, and dignity: those of the Empire, its ruler and princes; and 
those, more broadly, of the German people, as the Empire’s rightful custodians. 
Common political identities in the Middle Ages were defined in ways that were both 
legalistic and comparative: their essence was expressible in terms of concrete privileges and 
entitlements; and they were conceived and measured in relation to the rights and titles of other 
peoples. Privilege was the reflection and consequence of a people’s fame – its reputacioun, as 
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the poet John Lydgate put it.
42
 ‘I am born of the famous name of Britons’, declared a 
Welshman in the eleventh century.
43
 The ‘famous chivalry of Englishmen’ was taken by 
Lydgate as a subject for celebration.
44
 ‘It is not without reason that this nation [the French] 
grew famous above other nations’, insisted the Grandes Chroniques.45 Collective privileges, it 
was firmly believed, had been earned, through illustrious common deeds in times past. They 
needed constantly to be vindicated anew through further conspicuous acts, and defended, by 
watching with a jealous eye for slights and infringements. Peoples, just like great families, 
subsisted within a public economy of honour and title; and, like great families, they too might 
be ‘ruined’ by allowing themselves to be shamed, and stripped or robbed of their dignities. 
The ‘name and nobility’ of the Welsh, according to one fourteenth-century writer, had been 
destroyed by the English.
46
 The German people had its own collective patent of nobility in its 
claim to the Roman Empire, made manifest in the power of election exercised by its princes.
47
 
To forfeit these titles, or to permit an unjust pope publicly to trample on them, was to court 
oblivion. 
 
The fact that medieval observers did not always have physical slaugher in mind when they 
wrote of the destruction of peoples does not mean that they did not regard the prospect as a 
terrible one. Titles mattered, and their loss had grave material consequences. Of course, 
Ludwig’s manifesto did not at all mean to suggest that John XXII was seeking the physical 
annihilation of the Empire’s German subjects. Nevertheless, the same document insisted, the 
pope did have innocent blood on his hands, since the divisions which he had deliberately 
sown in Germany created conditions of anarchy in which many were dying.
48
 To strip a 
people of its identity, in the form of its rights and liberties, was to render it incapable of its 
own defence, and thus expose it to the gravest of perils. The spectre of mass bloodshed, shut 
out at one door, thus re-enters by another. This way of thinking can be approached a little 
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more closely in an observation made by the Bernese chronicler Konrad Justinger, who told 
how in the fourteenth century the town of Bern had been menaced by its greedy aristocratic 
neighbours.  Their goal, he explained, was to possess the town in perpetuity, killing all the 
inhabitants, men and women, young and old.
49
 A town, just like a people, was conceivable as 
a community of a shared identity, rooted in law and privilege. To forfeit these was to stand 
helpless before an implacably hostile world. From disenfranchisement, and loss of common 
identity, to physical annihilation, Justinger’s remark implies, was but a short step. 
An extreme illustration of the peril to which peoples lacking legal rights might find 
themselves exposed is seen in the call which Bernard of Clairvaux issued in March 1147, for 
a crusade against the pagan Slavs of the southern Baltic.
50
 Adopting the language of ethnicity 
which was traditional when referring to heathens, he called on the crusaders to ‘take 
vengeance on the (pagan) peoples – nationes – and exterminate them from the land of our 
Christian name’. They should take up the cross, he urged, ‘in order either completely to 
destroy those nationes or definitively convert them’. There should be no peace ‘until, with 
God’s aid, either the [heathen] rite itself or the population [natio] has been destroyed’.51 
Bernard’s call to arms has been a source of controversy among historians, not all of whom 
have wanted to accept that he really did have in mind the physical obliteration – the killing or 
expulsion – of recalcitrant Slavs.52 But that, surely, remains the most plausible reading of his 
words. They therefore suggest that while medieval notions of genocide were not confined to 
those acts of mass slaughter and eviction which we associate with modernity, such deeds were 
nevertheless quite thinkable, and might even be urged on occasion as desirable. 
 So readily thinkable were they, in fact, that subsequent generations in some quarters 
came firmly to believe that they had actually taken place. What above all else fitted 
Charlemagne for emperorship was, for one German town chronicler, that he had ‘forcibly 
converted the heathens in many parts [of the world] to the Christian faith or had expelled 
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them from Christian lands’.53 Later medieval commentators had none of the modern scholar’s 
scruples about interpreting as ethnic destruction the religious purges of times past. A Hussite 
manifesto of 1420 warned its Czech audience that ‘just as they [i.e., the Germans] did to our 
tongue on the Rhine, in Misnia, in Prussia, and drove it out, the same they intend to do to us 
and to occupy the places of the banished’.54 Out of a hazy recollection of the contests between 
Christian and pagan in the northern Europe of the central Middle Ages – and the 
accompanying advance of German settlement across the region – the compiler(s) had 
conjured a lurid panorama of epic sweep, taking the form of a series of interconnected historic 
struggles for ethnic survival. That the Czechs’ ‘Slav’ cousins had, as the manifesto told it, 
been in every case the losers, and endured the dispossession which inevitably followed, was 
meant to be understood as both a terrible warning and an urgent call to arms.
55
 With even 
Bernard’s religious underpinnings stripped away, the mythologised historical vision with 
which its audience was presented was bleak indeed: a bitter and unremitting inter-ethnic fight 
to the death.  
 Nor should the opportunities be minimised which could arise in medieval Europe for 
ethnic groups actually to be targeted for attack. Massacres, and the deliberate terrorising of 
whole populations, were not uncommon, particularly in time of war. The German king 
William of Holland (1247-56) dated a document drawn up during a military campaign with 
the words, ‘in camp while depopulating West Frisia’.56 In such a climate, violence could 
quickly take on an ethnic colouring. Language differences, for example, were more than just a 
learned topos for explaining and simplifying acts of bloodshed. They were a real source of 
distinctions, which could on occasion have grave consequences. When a chronicler claims 
that William Wallace, on his raids into the north of England, spared no-one who spoke the 
English language, the reader is surely right to be sceptical.
57
 But other reports in similar vein 
are less easily dismissed. In 1421, Nuremberg’s councilmen wrote to the town of Ulm, 
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recounting the deeds of a German crusading army which had been sent against the Bohemian 
Hussites. ‘The common soldiery’, they reported, were ‘running wild’. ‘Anyone who cannot 
speak German, or who appears to be Czech, is taken captive, beaten to death and burnt, 
because the men are out of control, since the army is so great and mighty.’58 Viewed in light 
of a sober, matter-of-fact statement such as this, the unreflective readiness with which some 
medieval writers were able to envisage acts of ethnic slaughter becomes a little easier to 
understand. 
 
More fundamentally, however, when they turned their minds to the destruction of peoples, 
they were able to draw upon an inheritance of knowledge and assumption which assured them 
that such acts of mass slaughter had occurred before – assured them, indeed, that it was 
inevitable and proper that from time to time they should occur. Within the Judeo-Christian 
history of salvation, the obliteration and replacement of peoples was a principal motor of 
advance and historical change: 
 
And at that time came Joshua, and cut off the Anakims from the mountains, from 
Hebron, from Debir, from Anab, and from all the mountains of Judah, and from the 
mountains of Israel: Joshua destroyed them utterly with their cities. There were none 
of the Anakims left in the land of the children of Israel.
59
 
 
Biblical history was ethnic history. Those peoples which did not enjoy divine favour were 
fated to be destroyed, and their destruction was characteristically a violent one.
60
 From the 
very start, in Eden, God’s wrath found expression as eviction and purge. ‘Let us go down, and 
there confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech’, God says 
of the builders of the Tower of Babel. ‘So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon 
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the face of all the earth.’61 The creation and the destiny of peoples were inseparable from acts 
of mass devastation and banishment. 
Such messages were not lost upon western Europeans in the Middle Ages, whose own 
pagan traditions had likewise been capable of envisaging scenes of cataclysmic destruction.
62
 
A people’s status and its liberty were given expression in accounts of bloody triumph in the 
crucial founding epoch of its history. Origin legends did not always look back to primal acts 
of ethnic slaughter and displacement; but they did so often enough for the fact to be 
significant.
63
 Brutus and his Trojans had driven out the giants whom they encountered on 
arrival in Britain, killing some, banishing others to remote, inhospitable regions.
64
 When 
Alexander the Great’s disbanded Macedonian followers came into Germany, according to one 
thirteenth-century account they slaughtered all the inhabitants except for the peasantry, whose 
labours they planned to exploit.
65
 The Scottish people, claimed the Declaration of Arbroath 
(1320), had gained its land ‘having first driven out the Britons and altogether destroyed the 
Picts’.66 The continental Saxons, according to their settlement myth, had won their land at the 
expense of Thuringians, who were there before them – again, partly through slaughter, partly 
by expelling the survivors.
67
 The Saxon World Chronicle claimed that the River Oker, which 
flows through Braunschweig, had its name from Overkêr – crossing over: what the ancient 
Saxons compelled the Thuringians to do.
68
  
The epic, sanguinary struggles of Dark-Age peoples, adumbrated in their origin 
legends, found corroboration in the fuller, more circumstantial accounts of early medieval 
historians like Gildas and Bede.
69
 In Bede’s Ecclesiastical History, the biblical template of 
divine destiny made manifest through ethnic destruction and replacement found authoritative 
expression, encapsulated in his portrait of King Æthelfrith: 
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For no ruler or king had subjected more land to the English people or settled it, having 
first either exterminated or conquered the natives. To him, in the character of Saul, 
could fittingly be applied the words which the patriarch said when he was blessing his 
son, ‘Benjamin shall ravin as a wolf; in the morning he shall devour the prey and at 
night shall divide the spoil’.70 
 
 Underpinning the reading of accounts such as this was the commonplace, regularly 
repeated by medieval commentators, that the natural relationship between different peoples 
was enmity. ‘As long as the world exists the German will never be brother to the Pole’, a 
proverb insisted.
71
 The British, claimed St Guthlac of Crowland’s hagiographer, were ‘the 
implacable enemies of the Saxon race’.72  So ancient and deep-rooted was the mutual loathing 
of ‘the German and Czech tongues’, reflected one late medieval observer, that they could no 
more bear one another than Samaritan and Jew.
73
 It was necessary only to project onto such 
primal visions of ethnic antagonism a narrative charting, like Bede’s, the rightful ascent of 
God’s chosen people, for it to become compellingly clear that separating sheep from goats, by 
all means necessary, was a pious task, serving the ends of divine providence. By the late 
Middle Ages, calls to do God’s purifying work might be uttered not only from within the 
bosom of the Catholic Church but at its contested margins. The Czech reformer Jan Hus was 
alleged by a witness at his trial at Constance to have publicly declared, shortly after the 
enforced departure of German masters and students from the University of Prague (1409), that 
it was God who should be praised ‘because we have got rid of the Germans’.74 
 
None of this is likely to persuade those who argue for the quintessential modernity of 
genocide to adjust their chronologies by a millennium or more. Nor, on the main point at 
issue, should it: the sheer magnitude of organised ethnic destruction in the modern world 
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forbids hasty or facile comparisons.
75
 The ‘modernists’, however, typically go further. The 
defining element of modern mass killing, they argue, lies in its systematic character, and thus 
its totality; qualities which, it is claimed, are inseparably bound up with the emergence of new 
forms of bureaucratic government in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
76
 Some 
medievalists, of course, have for a long time been urging a different, altogether earlier, 
chronology for the ‘modernisation’ of European institutions and political culture. ‘Let me 
state a certainty’, James Campbell has written: ‘Late Anglo-Saxon England was a nation-
state’.77 It is not necessary to share Campbell’s certainty on the subject in order to agree that 
at least one act of late Old-English government – the St Brice’s Day massacre – ill-
documented though it is, appears chillingly redolent of the state-sponsored purges of more 
recent times. The Anglo-Saxon chronicle, despite its terseness, portrays the action both as 
comprehensive and as originating in royal command.
78
 It is probably wise to treat sceptically 
Henry of Huntingdon’s much later account, which depicts the king systematically dispatching 
secret letters to every town in his realm, ordering that the Danes be killed.
79
 Yet it at least 
underlines how ambitious was Henry’s own view of the capabilities of English royal 
government (and how sinister his notions of its means and ends), that he judged such a co-
ordinated pogrom conceivable. 
 As the scope of royal government was extended in European kingdoms during the 
central and later Middle Ages, so also was its capacity forcibly to re-draw the ethnic map. 
This growing potential found drastic expression in Frederick II’s expulsion of the Muslim 
population from Sicily and their forced resettlement in the mainland town of Lucera.
80
 More 
notorious examples of the same princely capability and will are the expulsion of the Jews 
from England in 1290 and the very much larger royally-sponsored purges of the Jewish 
populations of France and Spain in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
81
 But royal power 
was not only being applied to simplify the map of peoples. Kings also acted to draw outsiders 
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into their realms, in processes which brought their own tensions and conflicts. ‘Hence may the 
English learn to call in foreigners, if they wish to be exiled by strangers’, mused the Song of 
Lewes bitterly.
82
 Demands that the aliens around the throne be sent packing became a familiar 
refrain, raised in diverse parts of Europe by aggrieved native elites and their spokespersons.
83
 
The happy example of earlier rulers might here be called upon to shame their descendants. 
The Dalimil chronicle, compiled early in the fourteenth century and probably aimed at a 
Czech-speaking noble audience, thus recounted a number of edifying tales of princely 
xenophobia from times past. In one of these, a Bohemian duke had given ‘the Germans’ just 
three days to get out, the chronicler telling how one well-born member of that group, an 
abbess, was placed on a cart and unceremoniously dumped in the Bavarian forest.
84
 From 
time to time, the clamour which such tales nurtured and reflected proved irresistible. A revolt 
among his nobles forced Duke Ziemomysl of Kuyavya (d. 1287) to withdraw property and 
privileges from the German knights whom he had invited to his court, and eventually to expel 
them altogether.
85
 
 The king who surrounded himself with worthless foreigners while shunning his own 
loyal subjects was a well-established type for the tyrant. But the consequences of such 
arbitrary actions seemed to be magnified when they were coupled to the changes in social and 
economic life, and accompanying population movements, which Latin Europe witnessed 
between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries. As a result of these, the foreigners who 
now entered some European kingdoms under the prince’s protection no longer consisted only 
of small secular and clerical elites.
86
 To contemporaries, the developments taking place could 
sometimes appear sinister and portentous in the extreme. Annals from Prague report under the 
year 1257 how the Bohemian king Otakar II (1253-78) – a notable patron of German 
immigration into his kingdom – ‘expelled the Bohemians from the suburb’ beneath Prague 
castle, ‘and settled aliens’ there.87 The rumour of Otakar’s dark intentions grew, as was the 
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natural tendency of such tales, in the decades after his death. According to one later 
chronicler, the king had promised his German protégés that he would give them the entire 
land of Bohemia to hold in perpetuity.
88
 It became possible for hostile pamphleteers to portray 
such nightmare visions as imminent and fundamental threats to the ethnic identity, and thus 
the very existence, of the realm. Given the gravity of the alien menace, it was vital that the 
natives get their retaliation in first (a familiar refrain among modern ethnic cleansers too).
89
 
By the later Middle Ages, Czech polemicists are to be found urging that Bohemia’s 
immigrant German populations be rooted out – like weeds from the garden, as one chronicler 
put it (and again, the metaphors of parasites and vermin repeatedly to be found in such 
writings seem disturbingly familiar ones).
90
 The Hussite conflagration in the fifteenth century 
was to bring, in certain regions at least, a fulfilment of just such longings.
91
 
 
Latin Europe in the Middle Ages differed profoundly from those societies which are most 
associated with modern ethnic purges. And the acts of bloodshed which have been discussed 
above were of a different character from modern ones: more localised, less thoroughgoing, 
and less terrible in scale. But the modesty of the coercive resources available to medieval 
government can be overstated: by the later Middle Ages some regimes were capable of acting 
against unpopular or inconvenient minorities with a speed and efficiency which left 
contemporaries fascinated and – sometimes, though by no means always – appalled. ‘You 
have achieved in one day what the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt failed to do’, marvelled one 
chronicler of Edward I’s expulsion of the Jews. Another observer deemed the king’s actions, 
more ambivalently, to be ‘something most remarkable, that should not be passed over in 
silence’.92 Social change also had a part in facilitating such purges, penning up minorities 
within the walls of towns, and often within their own distinct neighbourhoods, where in time 
of disturbance they were easy prey for the aggrieved and the politically opportunistic alike.
93
 
 17 
In any case, as recent prominent instances ought to make clear, modern ethnic slaughter does 
not necessarily depend for its occurrence upon the governmental and technological resources 
usually associated with modernity: when popular moods and mentalities favour extreme 
action, the most basic means often suffice.
94
 
 In its modes of thought and assumption, moreover, Latin Europe in the Middle Ages 
appears a rather less alien place than modern scholarship has often assumed it to be. The 
destruction of medieval peoples, it is true, was envisaged – whether with horror, glee, or the 
calm acceptance of assumed historical fact – far more frequently and characteristically than it 
was ever enacted. But envisaged it repeatedly was, and such imaginative acts themselves have 
much to disclose. Images of ethnic purge and replacement were written into the very DNA of 
medieval religious and political assumption. They supplied, to mix metaphors, a default mode 
for understanding certain kinds of political violence and upheaval. Whenever people found 
their essentially static, a-historical notions of community and identity challenged by social 
dynamism and political change, the spectre of ethnic destruction was able to do service both 
as a category of historical explanation and as a rallying cry in political struggles. Medieval 
people did not in every case envisage such destruction as genocidal, at least in post-twentieth-
century terms. Nevertheless, they did understand well a truth which their modern European 
descendants have repeatedly been forced to re-learn: that from stripping a people of its legal 
and political safeguards, to taking away its dignity, its property, and even the lives of its 
members, could prove on occasion to be perilously short and easy steps. 
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